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SURVEY ARTICLES 
Administrative Law 
by Paul A. LeBel* 
This survey of Eleventh Circuit administrative law decisions• covers 
the law applicable to the administrative agencies, rather than the law ap-
plied by those agencies. The substantive law administered by the agencies 
is beyond the scope of this survey. The surveyed cases may be broken 
down into two major categories: decisions relating to administrative 
decisionmaking and decisions concerning judicial review of administrative 
actions. 
I. ADMINISTRATIVE DEcrsmNMAKING 
A. Authority to Act 
Administrative agencies are creatures of the legislature, and exercise 
only the authority that has been delegated to them. Since the half-cen-
tury old Supreme Court decisions striking down portions of the New Deal 
• Associate Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and 
Mary. George Washington University (A.B., 1971); University of Florida (J.D., 1977). Mem· 
ber, State Bar of Florida. 
The author would like to thank Megan Gideon, William and Mary Class of 1985, for her 
able research assistance in the preparation of this Article. 
1. This Article surveys decisions rendered by the Eleventh Circuit for December 1981 
through November 1983, including former Fifth Circuit cases decided by Eleventh Circuit 
panels. 
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program on delegation grounds, challenges to the constitutional validity 
of delegation seldom have been successful.• The Eleventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals, in United States v. Lippner, 8 raised the issue of the validity of a 
subsequent delegation of authority. This sub-delegation issue• arose in an 
appeal from a conviction for conspiracy to possess a controlled substance 
with intent to distribute. Methaqualone had been classified as a con-
trolled substance by the. Drug Enforcement Agency, even though the au-
thority to schedule controlled substances had been delegated by Congress 
to the Attorney General.' At issue was not whether further delegation of 
the Attorney General's authority was permitted, but rather whether the 
sub-delegation had been carried out in a Reorganization Plan, and thus 
was arguably beyond the scope of what could be legitimately accom-
plished in such a plan. 11 The Eleventh Circuit was able to avoid the issue 
of whether the sub-delegation would have been proper if it had occurred 
in a Reorganization Plan 7 by finding that the Attorney General actually 
effected the delegation by a separate order "within the scope of permissi-
ble delegation set by Congress."8 The court properly displayed a skeptical 
attitude toward the delegation challenge presented in Lippner. The same 
efficiency and expertise rationales that support delegation of authority 
from Congress to administrative bodies can be applied to delegation from 
a Cabinet-level officer-the delegatee-to the agency-the sub-dele-
gatee-with line responsibility for the particular problem. Putting road-
blocks in the way of such sub-delegation, or upholding peripheral chal-
lenges such as those that occurred in Lippner, would introduce an 
undesirable element of delay, uncertainty, and excessive formality in the 
transfer of authority to the administrative level where it can most effec-
tively be exercised. 
2. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Refining Co. 
v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935). There are rumblings in recent Supreme Court opinions sug-
gesting a renewed interest in the use of nondelegation principles to invalidate agency action. 
See generally Schwartz, Some Recent Administrative Law Trends: Delegations and Judi-
cial Review, 1982 W1s. L. REv. 208, 210-14. 
3. 676 F.2d 456 (11th Cir. 1982). 
4. See 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE §§ 3:16-:18 (2d ed. 1978). 
5. 21 u.s.c. § 811 (1976). 
6. 676 F.2d at 460-61. 
7. Apparently, language in a Fifth Circuit opinion was responsible for the impression 
that the Drug Enforcement Administration received its classification authority from the Re-
organization Plan. See United States v. Gordon, 580 F.2d 827, 838 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 
439 U.S. 1051 (1978). The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals explained this language in 
Lippner, 676 F.2d at 460 n.6. 
8. 676 F.2d at 461. 
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B. Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication 
One of the principal advantages of delegating problem-solving author-
ity to an administrative agency is the agency's ability to proceed by gen-
eralized, prospective rulemaking rather than case-by-case adjudication. 
When an agency possesses both rulemaking and adjudicatory power, a 
line of United States Supreme Court cases supports the proposition that 
the choice 'of which power to exercise is within the informed discretion of 
the agency.9 The propriety of an agency's exercise of that discretion was 
questioned in litigation challenging Social Security Administration rules 
used in making disability benefit determinations.10 The court's initial 
consideration of the issue in Broz v. Schweiker11 resulted in a judgment 
that was vacated by the United States Supreme Court.11 On remand, the 
court of appeals essentially adhered to its earlier decision.18 The regula-
tions that were being challenged required an agency to decide the issue of 
whether the disability claimant was capable of other substantial alld gain-
ful work in the national economy. A negative conclusion was required for 
an award of benefits.14 The grid factors employed in the regulations in-
cluded the claimant's age, education, and work experience characteris-
tics. 111 In its 1982 decision, the Eleventh Circuit invalidated the applica-
tion of the regulations insofar as they deprived the claimant of an 
individual hearing on the question of the effect of age on the ability to 
adapt to a new job.16 Conclusive determination of ability to adapt based 
on age can thus be viewed as an abuse of the agency's discretion to choose 
between rulemaking and adjudication. The effect of age on the ability to 
adapt "is decidedly an adjudicative factor and therefore must be given 
individual consideration through adjudication rather than legislative reso-
lution through rulemaking."17 At roughly the same time as the Eleventh 
9. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974); Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 
(1974); NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 
194 (1947). See generally B. ScHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVB LAw §§ 4.15-.16 (2d ed. 1984); Sha-
piro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of Administrative 
Policy, 78 HARv. L. REv. 921 (1965). 
10. Broz v. Schweiker, 677 F.2d 1351 (11th Cir. 1982), vacated sub nom. Heckler v. Broz, 
103 S. Ct. 2421 (1983), on remand Broz v. Heckler, 711 F.2d 957 (11th Cir. 1983). The rules 
at issue were the Medical-Vocational Guidelines, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1599, app. 2 at 313 (1983). 
The rules are known generally as 'grid regulations.' 677 F.2d at 1354. 
11. 677 F.2d 1351 (11th Cir. 1982). 
12. Heckler v. Broz, 103 S. Ct. 2421 (1983), remanded for reconsideration in light of 
Heckler v. Campbell, 103 S. Ct. 1952 (1983). 
13. Broz v. Heckler, 711 F.2d 957 (11th Cir. 1983). 
14. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A) (1976). 
15. 20 C.F.R. at § 404.1599, app. 2 at 313 (1983). 
16. 677 F.2d at 1355. 
17. Id. at 1360. 
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Circuit issued its relatively narrow holding in Broz, the Court of Appeals · 
for the Second Circuit issued a more sweeping invalidation of the use of 
the grid regulations.•• The Supreme Court, however, reversed the Second 
Circuit's decision.18 The Court subsequently vacated the Eleventh Circuit 
judgment for reconsideration in light of its decision upholding the regula-
tions,110 even though the Court had noted that Broz presented a different 
issue.u The Eleventh Circuit then reaffirmed its earlier holding regarding 
the validity of the regulations.•• 
The Eleventh Circuit's decisions in Broz attempted to delineate the 
range of decisionmaking that can be handled on a general rather than a 
specific basis. The key to the validity of an agency's choice between 
rulemaking and adjudication is the distinction between legislative facts, 
which are properly determined in a rulemaking proceeding, and adjudica-
tive facts, which must be determined only after an opportunity for an 
individual hearing.13 The court admitted that the distinction between leg-
islative facts and adjudicative facts may not always be an easy one to 
draw.•• Nevertheless, the court properly undertook a functional review of 
the agency procedure, deciding what type of fact the agency was finding, 
and then requiring the agency to employ the kind of proceeding that was 
appropriate for that type of fact. 
The converse of the issue in Broz was before the court in McHenry v. 
Bond.15 Whereas Broz concerned an agency's attempt to determine adju-
dicative facts in a rulemaking proceeding, McHenry raised the issue of 
whether an agency could set standards and policies in an adjudicative 
proceeding. Subject to limitations requiring an explanation of departures 
from prior decisions,•• the practice obtained at least tacit approval from 
the Eleventh Circuit. The McHenry decision may appear to undercut the 
distinction carefully constructed in Broz. If adjudicative facts are inap-
propriately determined in a rulemaking proceeding, standards and poli-
cies arguably would be most· appropriately set in rulemaking proceedings. 
In that type of proceeding the agency would have the fullest opportunity 
18. Campbell v. Secretary of the Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 665 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 
1981), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 1952 (1983). 
19. Heckler v. Campbell, 103 S. Ct. 1952 (1983). 
20. Heckler v. Broz, 103 S. Ct. 2421 (1983) •. 
21. Heckler v. Campbell, 103 S. Ct. at 1956 n.8. 
22. Broz v. Heckler, 711 F.2d 957, 959 (11th Cir. 1983). 
23. 677 F.2d at 1356-58. "Adjudicative facts usually answer the questions of who did 
what, where, when, how, why, with what motive or intent .... Legislative facts ... are the 
general facts which help the tribunal decide questions of law and policy and discretion." 2 
K. DAVIS, AnMINISTRATlVB LAw TREATisB, § 12:3, at 413 (2d ed. 1979). 
24. 677 F .2d at 1358. 
25. 668 F.2d 1185 (11th Cir. 1982). 
26. See infra text accompanying notes 83-106. 
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to explore the implications of the policy options open to it, to obtain the 
benefit of broader participation by interested and affected parties, and to 
provide more widespread notice of its decision. 17 
The court's failure to force the agency into rulemaking for setting pol-
icy may indicate that the heightened scrutiny of the Broz case will be 
applied only when the agency's choice of procedure affects the hearing 
rights of the persons concerned. Even that conclusion, however, is called 
into question by the court's decision in Anniston Broadcasting Co. v. 
FCC.28 In 1975, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) had is-
sued divestiture requirements for owners of multiple media outlets in a 
community, but had included a waiver provision.•• Mter petitioners' re-
quests for waivers were denied,80 one of the grounds for challenging the 
denial was the agency's refusal to provide evidentiary hearings. The court 
held that hearings were not required, concluding that because the FCC 
was concerned with a class of entities rather than focussing on a particu-
lar individual, the agency was performing a rulemaking· function.81 The 
Broz analysis would call for a more careful inquiry into the type of facts 
the agency used as the basis for its decision. If the agency relied on adju-
dicative facts in deciding whether to grant a waiver, then a hearing could 
not be avoided under the guise of the agency simply applying previously 
issued rules. One of the criteria for granting a waiver was that the pur-
poses of the divesture rule would be better served by the continuation of 
the current ownership pattern. 81 Consideration of this factor would seem 
to involve precisely the kind of specific facts that could be designated 
adjudicative. 88 An argumeni could be made that the overall agency deci-
sion is legislative in nature because the agency conclusion is a matter of 
policy; however, the better view would be that the facts about a particular 
market are adjudicative facts that are best developed at a hearing. 
In. its decision in American Trucking Association v. United States,IU 
the Eleventh Circuit rejected the Interstate Commerce Commission's 
(ICC) attempt to characterize one of its actions as "a series of decisions in 
discrete cases . . . all taken at the same time. "8' The court decided that 
the agency's decision to revoke all outstanding authority and implicitly 
indicate that future authorities would not be issued "is clearly a rule,"88 
27. See generally 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVB LAw TREATISE §§ 14:4-:6 (2d ed. 1980). 
28. 668 F.2d 829 (5th Cir. 1982) (Unit B). 
29. ld. at 830. 
30. ld. 
31. ld. at 832. 
32. ld. at 831. 
33. See 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 23, § 12:3. 
34. 688 F.2d 1337 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 3109 (1983). 
35. 688 F.2d at 1348. 
36. ld. 
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and therefore was invalid for failure to comply with the appropriate 
rulemaking procedures.'" The court's analysis was clearly wrong on both 
counts. First, the court failed to distinguish between a rule and a policy 
developed in a course of adjudication, precisely the distinction that was 
recognized in McHenry. 111 A departure from previously settled policy may. 
need to be explained, 81 but characterizing the departure as rulemaking 
indicates a misunderstanding of the discretion that agencies have in 
choosing whether to proceed by adjudication rather than by rulemaking 
procedures. Second, even if the court properly decided that the agency 
had issued a rule, the court failed to address the possibility that the rule 
was exempt from the rulemaking procedures the agency omitted. •o 
C. Rules and Rulemaking Procedure 
Types of Rules. The Administrative Procedure Act (AP A) contem-
plates four different types. of nonadjudicatory decisions41 by administra-
tive agencies: interpretative rules, general statements of policy, proce-
dural and organizational rules, and a category the Eleventh Circuit 
helpfully designates legislative rules ... The classification of a particular 
rule can have importance in determining what procedure the agency is 
required to follow;" and what degree of deference reviewing courts will 
give to the rule." 
In American Trucking Association v. United States, •• the Eleventh 
Circuit distinguished legislative from nonlegislative rules on the basis of 
"the power the agency chooses to exercise in promulgating its rules."'' 
Rules that merely interpret and implement legislation are nonlegislative, 
because the statute itself remains the ultimate source of the obligations 
imposed on those subject to the agency's authority." Rules that impose 
additional obligations rather than simply interpreting the statute are leg-
islative in nature:" In essence, this test asks whether the source of the 
duty imposed on the regulated parties is the statute or the subsequent 
agency pronouncement. ·This inquiry, however, is not likely to be a profit-
37. ld. 
38. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text. 
39. See infra text accompanying notes 83-106. 
40. See infra text accompanying notes 41-50. 
41. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1982). 
42. See American Trucking Ass'n v. United States, 688 F.2d 1337 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. 
granted, 103 S. Ct. 3109 (1983). 
43. See infra text aceompanying notes 51-56. 
44. See infra text accompanying notes 57-71. 
45. 688 F.2d 1337 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 3109 (1983). 
46. 688 F.2d at 1344. 
47. ld. at 1341-42. 
48. ld. at 1341. 
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able one. All administrative agencies ultimately can be traced back to leg- · 
islation. The test seems, therefore, to turn on a determination of whether 
the agency is merely finetuning a statutory scheme or is instead filling in 
details that the statutory scheme does not address. The line between 
those two types of agency action is not one that would be easy to locate. 
A better standard to distinguish legislative from nonlegislative rules is the 
test employed by the court in Ryder Truck Lines v. United States .. to 
distinguish between a rule and a general statement of policy. According to 
the court, the key inquiry is 
the extent to which the challenged policy leaves the agency free to exer-
cise its discretion to follow or not to follow the general policy in an indi-
vidual case, or . . . whether the policy so fills out the statutory scheme 
that upon application one need only determine whether a given case is 
within the rule's criterion. As long as the agency remains free to consider 
the individual facts in the various cases that arise, then the agency action 
in question has not established a binding norm." 
The Ryder test classifies rules according to the degree to which they turn 
subsequent agency decisionmaking into a ministerial application of pre-
determined policy. Applying this test to the ICC rules challenged in 
American Trucking Association would have the advantage that a single 
standard would be used for classification of rules on both of the major 
issues for which such classification is relevant-rulemaking procedure and 
the amount of deference to the agency decision. 
Rulemaking Procedures. One of the ICC decisions challenged in 
· American Trucking Association•n was invalidated for failure to follow the 
notice and comment rulemaking provisions of the AP A." Assuming that 
the agency action was properly characterized as rulemaking,11 the court 
then should have considered whether the rule fell into one of the catego-
ries exempt from notice and comment rulemaking. 14 Implicit in the 
court's imposition of the AP A's procedural requirements is the conclusion 
that the rule was legislative in nature.11 This conclusion appears to be 
inconsistent with the court's stance in the rest of its opinion emphasizing 
the nonlegislative nature of the challenged rules. The suggestion made at 
49. 716 F.2d 1369 (11th Cir. 1983). 
50. Id. at 1377. 
51. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text. 
52. The ICC decision reduced the time in which a proposed rate change would become 
effective from thirty days to five days. 688 F.2d at 1347-48. 
53. See supra notes 34-40 and accompanying text. 
54. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1982). 
55. The court stated that it was not called upon to rule on the availability of tbe good 
cause/unnecessary exception to notice and comment rulemaking, 688 F.2d at 1348 n.16, but 
did not even address tbe interpretative rule/general statement of policy exception. 
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the end of the preceding subsection, that the extent of the rule's binding 
effect on the agency should be used as the test to determine whether a 
rule is legislativeM may lend support to the court's conclusion that the 
agency action was subject to notice and comment rulemaking procedures. 
Using that test likely would result in a determination that the rule fell 
into the category of nonexempt legislative rules. 
Eifect of Rules. When an agency has issued rules, an unremarkable 
consequence of that agency action is that the rules must be followed. The 
Eleventh Circuit considered the binding effect of rules on the issuing 
agency itself in a number of cases. For example, in Payne v. Block,"'7 the 
court required the Farmers Home Administration to reopen the applica-
tion period for an emergency loan program because the agency had failed 
to comply with its own regulations on providing notice to the public 
about the program's availability. M The court strictly applied regulations 
calling for inclusion of a specific provision in a state medicaid reimburse-
, ment plan in Alabama Hospital Association v. Bea8ley.11" In that case, the 
court concluded that the regulations left no discretion for the agency to 
approve a plan that omitted that specific provision. 60 The strictness of 
the requirement that the agency adhere to the regulations was enhanced 
by a statutory requirement to the same effect.'1 One of the grounds for 
setting aside an administrative penalty in Allied Products Co. v. Federal 
Mine Safety and Health Review Commission62 was the agency's failure to 
follow its own regulations for determining the number of penalty points 
that form the basis for the amount of the penalty." 
Agency rules can bind bodies other than the issuing agency. In King v. 
Housing Authority of Huntsville," the court required a local housing au-
thority to adhere to the letter of the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development procedural regulations, even though the procedures actually 
employed did not deprive the affected party of due process.'"' Finally, a 
court can be bound by legislative rules properly within the scope of an 
agency's authority, &though courts can set aside rules as being inconsis-
tent with statutory language and purpose. 86 
Under some circumstances, an agency's failure to follow its regulations 
56. See supra text accompanying notes 49-50. 
57. 714 F.2d 1510 (11th Cir. 1983). 
58. Id. at 1518. 
59. 702 F.2d 955 (11th Cir. 1983). 
60. Id. at 962. 
61. Id. at 956-57. 
62. 666 F.2d 890 (5th Cir. 1982) (Unit B). 
63. Id. at 896. 
64. 670 F.2d 952 (11th Cir. 1982). 
65. Id. at 954-55. 
66. See United States v. Tilton, 705 F.2d 429, 431 (11th Cir. 1983). 
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may rise to the level of a violation of due process. In Southern Coopera-
tive Development Fund v. Driggers,67 the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a dis-
trict court's judgment" to that effect.611 Reasoning that an arbitrary re-
striction on land use would violate due process, the court held that 
county subdivision regulations imposed an administrative duty on the 
county commission to approve a subdivision plat that complied with the 
regulations, thus making the commission's refusal to approve the plat ar-
bitrary.70 Although this case concerns land use standards dating back to 
the Supreme Court's decision in Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,71 a princi-
ple of somewhat broader applicability may emerge from the decision. 
When agency action implicates an interest protected by due process, an 
objection to an agency's failure to adhere to its own regulations might be 
cast in terms of a due process violation. 
D. Adjudication 
Bearings. Two cases previously discussed,'~~ Broz v. Schweiker73 and 
Anniston Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,74 address the issue of whether an 
agency could preclude individual adjudicatory hearings by applying previ-
ously developed rules. Broz suggests that when the agency decision. turns 
on adjudicative rather than legislative facts, the agency must provide an 
opportunity for an individual hearing.70 When the agency's decision is 
nothing more than the application of policy decisions embodied in rules, 
the cases suggest that individual hearings are not required. In Anniston 
Broadcasting, the court upheld the agency's refusal to hold evidentiary 
hearings in denying the waivers the petitioners had requested.78 Hearings 
were not required when the agency action concerned a class of entities 
rather than specific individuals.77 As suggested earlier,78 this analysis 
stops short of addressing the important question of whether the agency's 
decision would be better informed if a hearing were held. In Broz, the 
67. 696 F.2d 1347 (11th Cir.), aff'g 527 F. Supp. 927 (M.D. Fla. 1981), cert. denied, 103 
S. Ct. 3539 (1983). 
68. Southern Coop. Dev. Fund v. Driggers, 527 F. Supp. 927 (M.D. Fla. 1981). 
69. 696 F.2d at 1356. 
70. ld. 
71. 272 u.s. 365 (1926). 
72. See supra text accompanying notes 10-24 & 28-33. 
73. 677 F.2d 1351 (11th Cir. 1982), vacated sub nom. Heckler v. Broz, 103 S. Ct. 2421 
(1983), on remand Broz v. Heckler, 711 F.2d 957 (11th Cir. 1983) (reaffirmed previous hold-
ing on validity of regulations). 
74. 668 F.2d 829 (5th Cir. 1982) (Unit B). 
75. 677 F.2d at 1360. 
76. 668 F.2d at 832. 
77. ld. 
78. See supra text accompanying notes 32-33. 
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court's focus on whether adjudicative facts need to be developed offers a 
more promising line of analysis, by recognizing that adjudicative facts 
might be relevant even when the agency is engaged in the application of 
previously formulated policy decisions. 
One decision of the Eleventh Circuit suggests that oral hearings will not 
be required when the party requesting such a hearing has had an oppor-
tunity to address all the issues in its written submissions. In Refrigerated 
Transport Co. v. ICC,18 the court raised a challenge to the agency's grant 
of operating authority to a motor carrier. The hearing issue arose when an 
intervenor claimed a right to an oral presentation during a r~hearing of 
the agency's initial decision, alleging lack of notice that certain issues 
would be considered. 80 The Eleventh Circuit upheld the agency decision 
to refuse oral testimony on rehearing on the basis that the intervenor was 
on notice of the issues the agency would consider in its initial considera-
tion of the application.'1 The court's decision is directed specifically at 
the intervenor's opportunity to know the issues that would be relevant to 
the agency's determination.'• Implicit in the decision, however, seems to 
be the conclusion that an oral presentation on rehearing would add noth-
ing to what the intervenor could have accomplished at the earlier oppor-
tunities to be heard, nor would it add to the arguments that were 
presented in the written petition for rehearing. 
Findings and Reasons. The AP A requires statements on findings 
and reasons in formal adjudicatory proceedings that are subject to the 
procedural requirements of the Act.81 In several decisions during the last 
two years, the Eleventh Circuit has drawn on its power of judicial review 
to require more specific findings and reasons than the agencies have pro-
vided When engaged in formal fmd informal adjudication.84 
Challenges to the Social Security Administration's denial of benefits 
provided the most instructive set of opinions on the need for agency ar-
ticulation of findings and reasons for an agency decision. The court seems 
79. 673 F.2d 1196 (11th Cir. 1982). 
80. Id. at 1197, 1199. 
81. Id. at 1199. 
82. Id. at 1199 n.6. 
83. See 5 U.S.C. § 557(c) (1982). The same requirements would apply to formal rulemak-
ing, while the notice and comment procedures of irlformal rulemaking contain a separate 
basis and purpose requirement. See id. § 553(c). The term 'formal' is used to designate 
those agency actions that crOBB the threshold of being "required by statute" to be decided 
"on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing." See id. §§ 553(c), 554(a). 
84. The Supreme Court's restrictions on judicial imposition of additional procedural re-
quirements in rulemaking cases governed by the notice and comment procedures of the APA 
(see Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978)) might be avoided 
by grounding the Court's dissatisfaction with the agency procedure in the inability of the 
court to perform its judicial review function. 
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to be particularly insistent that reasons be given in a determination of the 
credibility of an applicant or witness who appears before an Administra-
tive Law Judge (ALJ). Walden v. Schweiker,86 Viehman v. Schweiker," 
and Smallwood v. Schweiker"' are cases in which district court affir-
mances of agency denials of benefits were set aside by the court of ap-
peals and remanded for agency findings on the credibility issues. In each 
of the cases, a claimant presented evidence that, if believed, would have 
entitled the claimant to succeed in his or her claim. In Walden, the 
claimant testified that she was disabled because she suffered pain. She 
also introduced testimony by her daughter and a physician that she did 
have pain.18 The Eleventh Circuit stated that, in order to deny her claim, 
the ALJ must have disbelieved or disregarded the testimony of all three 
witnesses, but the ALJ had made no findings on the credibility issue.•• In 
Viehman, the claimant requested a waiver of an overpayment of social 
security benefits on the ground that he was without fault in continuing to 
accept payments after eligibility had ceased." His story, if believed, 
would have established his lack of fault, but the ALJ left open the issue 
of credibility. •• In Smallwood, the claimant testified that he experienced 
periodic blackouts that made him disabled. n Medical testimony sup-
ported a conclusion that he was disabled if he suffered blackouts, but the 
ALJ made no finding on the credibility of the claimant's story." There is 
a common thread running through these cases that provides an important 
clue for predicting when the court should remand for more complete 
findings. 
When the success of the claimant depends on the credibility of testi-
mony, the ALJ should make an express determination on the credibility 
issue. In the absence of such a finding, the agency decision may either 
appear to be based on the use of an improper te~t or otherwise be unsup-
ported by substantial evidence. In two of the cases discussed, it appears 
that if the ALJ actually had disbelieved the testimony, the agency deci-
sion would have been upheld. Disbelief of the Smallwood blackout testi-
mony would have lessened the weight of the medical testimony about the 
effect of such blackouts 'ir they Occurred. Disbelief of the Viehman story 
would have left the claimant with no other evidence to establish his lack 
85. 672 F.2d 835 (11th Cir. 1982). 
86. 679 F.2d 223 (11th Cir. 1982). 
87. 681 F.2d 1349 (11th Cir. 1982). 
88. 672 F.2d at 837, 839. 
89. Id. at 839. 
90. 679 F.2d at 225. 
91. Id. at 228-29. 
92. 681 F.2d at 1351. 
93. Id. at 1352. 
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of fault. Although there were other errors in Walden, .. disbelief of the 
pain testimony would have removed one of the grounds for establishing 
disability. If the testimony in the three cases had been credible, however, 
the agency, in denying the benefits, would appear to have been acting 
under an improper legal· standard, 81 or requiring more evidence than was 
necessary," or reaching a decision that was unsupported by subs~tial 
evidence." 
In contrast to these three cases is Smith v. Schweiker," in which the 
court commented favorably on the ALJ's eight page memorandum and 
findings of fact. The agency decision was a denial of the claim for bene-
fits, but in this case the completeness of. the reasons for the decision 
enunciated by the agency persuaded the court of appeals of the sound-
ness of the decision. While there is admittedly some additional adminis-
trative cost in making more detailed findings at the ALJ level, the extra 
effort would prove to be a worthwhile investment to avoid a remand for 
more complete findings, particularly in those cases concerning credibility. 
In those cases, if the agency had explicitly based its decisions on the wit-
nesses' lack of credibility, the decisions would probably have been . 
upheld." 
When a lack of findings and reasons raises the possibility that improper 
legal standards were applied, remand to the agency is the appropriate 
remedy. When the complaint, however, is that there is no way to tell how 
the agency reached its decision, the Eleventh Circuit cases display a func-
tional approach to the question of whether to remand. If there is no indi-· 
cation whatsoever of the basis for an agency conclusion, the court would 
be abdicating its reviewing function if it failed to insist on a "reviewable 
determination on the record."~00 But as long as the reviewing court can 
fulfill its reviewing function and the aggrieved party can determine 
whether and on what basis to seek judicial review,101 the court will not 
94. See infra notes 145-47 and accompanying text. 
95. 672 F.2d 835 (11th Cir. 1982). 
96. 679 F.2d 223 (11th Cir. 1982). 
97. 681 F.2d 1349 (11th Cir. 1982). 
98. 677 F.2d 826 (11th Cir. 1982). 
99. It is not only credibility issues in which more complete findings and reasons might 
avoid a judicial remand for reconsideration. In Wiggins v. Schweiker, 679 F.2d 1387 (11th 
Cir. 1982), the failure of the ALJ to describe the weight given to certain medical testimony 
left open the possibilty that the ALJ had not followed the correct legal principles. ld. at 
1390. Again, the point is that more detailed findings and reasons can reveal that the decision 
was supported by substantial evidence and was reached by applying the proper legal stan-
dards to the evidence. 
100. Refrigerated Transp. Co. v. ICC, 663 F.2d 528, 531 (5th Cir. 1981) (Unit B). 
101. Railroad Concrete Croaatie Corp. v. Railroad Retirement Bd., 709 F.2d 1404, 1407 
(11th Cir. 1983). 
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remand to the agency simply to force compliance with a formal require-
ment of reasons. The court has recognized that among the ways of fulfil-
ling those purposes are an opinion by an agency member,101 or a reference 
to an earlier agency decision that provides a full analysis.108 
In Baggett Transportation Co. v. United States,1CH the court properly 
could have demanded more detailed findings. The court reviewed the is-
sue of whether an ICC grant of authority required the agency to make 
specific findings on each of the factors set out in a statutory provision on 
transportation policy.106 The Eleventh Circuit noted that the factors were 
inconsistent, and that Congress intended for the agency to balance and 
weigh all the factors in any given case. The court then accepted as ade-
quate the agency's identification of what the competing considerations 
were.106 That treatment of the findings requirement may be perfectly rea-
sonable if the requirement is geared solely to judicial review. If the 
agency's balancing of these factors is to be given great deference, then the 
court's reviewing function can be fulfilled on a minimal statement of rea-
sons from the agency. Furthermore, the aggrieved party contemplating 
judicial review under such a deferential standard of review should realize 
that little will be required in the way of findings for the agency decision 
to survive a challenge on judicial review. There is, however, another major 
function that can be served by findings and reasons. An agency could be 
required to explain to the regulated parties 'how' it strikes the balance 
and 'how' it weighs the different factors. In doing so, the agency may 
eliminate some pointless administrative challenges, as well as make it eas-
ier for the regulated parties to predict agency decisions and plan their 
conduct in light of those agency expressions of how decisions are reached. 
Consistency in Agency Decisions. By issuing a number of deci-
sions in speCific cases, administrative agencies acting in an adjudicatory 
· capacity are in a position to develop an 'agency common law'; When 
agencies depart from their own precedents, however, reviewing courts 
may set aside the decisions under the arbitrary and capricious standard 
of review .107 
The consistency requirement does not require an agency to adhere to 
prior decisions. The court's concern is not so much with departure from 
102. Id. 
103. Veterans Admin. Medical Center v. FLRA, 675 F.2d 260, 266 (11th Cir. 1982). 
104. 666 F.2d 524 (11th Cir. 1982). 
105. Id. at 526. 
1(16. /d. at 530·31. See also C & H Transp. Co. v. ICC, 704 F.2d 834, 849 (5th Cir. 1983) 
(Thornberry, J., dissenting) (dissenting judge argued that an agency must identify the com· 
peting interests). . 
107. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982); see also Central Florida Gas Corp. v. Federal En· 
ergy Regulatory Comm'n, 678 F.2d 932 (11th Cir. 1982). 
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agency precedent as it is with 'unexplained' departure from precedent. 
The policy rationale of this corollary to the findings and reasons require-
ment108 is described by the Eleventh Circuit in McHenry v. Bond.109 Not 
only does agency adherence to its own precedent enable affected persons 
to predict future agency action, but adherence to agency precedent also 
raises an inference that "the agency is pursuing the policies committed to 
·it by Congress."110 In McHenry, the agency had reached the opposite con-
clusion on an issue that it decided seven years earlier. In 1972, the Na-
tional Transportation Safety Board had concluded that a particular medi-
cal diagnosis was an adequate explanation for a loss of memory. The 
Board then overruled that decision in McHenry, only offering statements 
that the agency now believed its earlier decision was incorrect.111 If the 
agency decision had been explained in terms of an increased concern for 
the risks incident to issuing a commercial pilot's license to someone who 
had experienced memory loss, then it is unlikely that a court would sub-
stitute its judgment on safety and risk factors for that of the agency. An 
explanation by the agency probably would have preserved the agency de-
cision from judicial overturning, by justifying the agency's departure from 
its earlier decision. 
Ironically, the Eleventh Circuit's treatment of inconsistent agency deci-
sions has not been consistent. In McHenry, the court remanded for an 
explanation of the departure from prior agency decisions;m however, in 
Bray v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs,118 instead 
of remanding to the agency, the court apparently speculated on what the 
agency's explanation would be and found that conjectured explanation 
unconvincing.11" 
The challenged agency action in Southern Motor Carriers Rate Confer· 
ence v. United Statesm was also inconsistent with prior agency deci-
sions.118 The agency simply should have explained that the departure 
from its precedent was justified by the adverse effects the agency had 
experienced under that precedent. A change of circumstances and the les-
sons of experience are sufficient to justify departure from agency prece-
dent, as illustrated by the court in Ryder Truck Lines v. United 
States.m In Ryder, however, the agency's reliance on its experience and 
108. See supra text accompanying notes 83-106. 
109. 668 F.2d 1185 (11th Cir. 1982). 
110. ld. at 1192. 
111. Id. at 1192-93. 
112. ld. at 1194. 
113. 664 F.2d 1045 (5th Cir. 1981) (Unit B). 
114. Id. at 1048. 
115. 676 F.2d 1374 (11th Cir. 1982). 
116. Id. at 1379. 
117. 716 F.2d 1369 (11th Cir. 1983). 
0 
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expertise had been "documented and made a part of the record so that 
the courts can determine whether the agency's action is facially ra-
tional,"118 and the decision was announced as a general statement of 
policy. 
When an agency's decision is inconsistent with its prior decisions but 
interprets the enabling legislation in a manner that is "consistent with 
the statute's language, structure, scheme, and available legislative his- · 
tory,"119 the court has dismissed the inconsistency argument as being in-
substantial.110 Such judicial action suggests that as the degree of judicial 
deference to agency decisionmaking authority increases, the court may be 
willing to focus its review on the latest in the line of decisions without 
displaying as much concern for inconsistency with prior agency decisions. 
The court's treatment of inconsistent decisions in Allied Products Co. 
v. Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission111 suggests that 
the court was engaging in a form of proportionality review. In setting 
aside administrative penalties as excessive and contrary to law, the court 
noted that the amounts of these fines were inconsistent with amounts as-
sessed in other cases.111 Although this was not the only problem with the 
penalties, 118 the court's remark suggests that departures from a pattern of 
penalty decisions may need to be explained in order to survive judicial 
review. 
Estoppel. The applicability of the principles of equitable estoppel to 
administrative actions is a matter on which the signals sent by the Su-
preme Court have been less than clear.114 In its recent decisions on estop-
pel, the Eleventh Circuit has displayed a reluctance to bind an agency, 
but the opinions consistently leave open the possibility that, on the 
proper showing, the court may decide that the agency is bound by the 
acts of lower echelon officials. 
In Deltona Corp. v. Alexander••• plaintiff asserted that the Corps of 
Engineers was estopped to deny permits for plaintiff's projects because 
the Corps was aware of plaintiff's plans and had failed to indicate disap-
118. Id. at 1385. 
119. Alabama Power Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 685 F.2d 1311, 1318 
(11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3573 (1983). 
120. 685 F.2d at 1318. 
121. 666 F.2d 890 (5th Cir. 1982) (Unit B). 
122. Id. at 896. The Supreme Court hae held that the Eighth Amendment does not re-
quire appellate court proportionality review in death penalty caeee. Pulley v. Barrie, 104 S. 
Ct. 871 (1984). 
123. The penalties were also contrary to the enabling legislation, its legislative history, 
and the regulations of the agency. 666 F.2d at 896. 
124. See generally 4 K. UAV1S, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE §§ 20:1-:6 (2d ed. 1983). 
125. 682 F.2d 888 (11th Cir. 1982). 
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proval. 118 The Eleventh Circuit rejected the estoppel argument, resting its 
decision on the broad principle that estoppel may not be asserted against 
the government acting in its sovereign capacity. 1217 Recognizing a potential 
exception to that rule, the court concluded that the agency's inaction had 
not risen to the level of affirmative misconduct.••• Thus, the court left 
open the question of whether estoppel would have been appropriate if the 
agency had been engaged in an essentially private activity, or if the offi-
cials had acted in a way that could be characterized as affirmative 
misconduct. 
One issue that runs through the estoppel cases is whether the agency is 
authorized to act in accordance with earlier representations that it made. 
In one case, the Veterans Administration had erroneously calculated the 
benefits an individual was entitled to collect, and thus a substantial share 
of the individual's tuition was left unpaid.119 The Eleventh Circuit re-
fused to bind the agency to its mistaken calculation, because Congress 
had not authorized payment in excess of the statutory ratio of entitle-
ments based on time in service.110 Even the lack of authorization of a 
specific agency official to act in a certain way can lead to the rejection of 
an estoppel argument. Because authority to take action was lodged in an 
agency committee rather than with the official to whom the representa-
tives of the plaintiff had spoken, the Eleventh Circuit in Mandalay 
Shores Cooperative Housing Association v. Pierce1111 held that unautho-
rized actions by that agency official did not bind the ag~ncy.1111 
The Eleventh Circuit had an opportunity in Fidalgo/Velez v. Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service11111 to rule on the issue of whether equita-
ble defenses could be asserted against a party seeking to estop a govern-
ment agency. Without expressly acknowledging that it was applying an 
unclean hands defense, the court did indicate approval of the agency con-
clusion that any harm to the plaintiff as a result of agency delay had been 
brought about by plaintiff's own conduct.u14 
The most significant of the Eleyenth Circuit's statements regarding es-
toppel occurred in Payne v. Block, 11111 previously discussed under the topic 
of the requirement that agencies follow their own rules.188 The agency in 
126. ld. at 891. 
127. ld. at 892. 
128. ld. 
129. Augusta Aviation, Inc. v. United States, 671 F.2d 445 (11th Cir. 1982). 
130. ld. at 448, 450. 
131. 667 F.2d 1195 (5th Cir.) (Unit B), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 446 (1982). 
132. 667 F.2d at 1197. 
133. 697 F.2d 1026 (11th Cir. 1983). 
134. ld. at 1030. 
135. 714 F.2d 1510 (11th Cir. 1983). 
136. See supra text accompanying notes 57-58. 
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that case had failed to provide the public notice of availability of relief 
called for in its own regulations.181 The agency argued that the attack on 
the agency action was based on estoppel principles, but the court rejected 
that argument, indicating a number of factors that took the case out of 
the estoppel category.188 The court characterized the agency action as 
"gross failure on the part of an entire agency to follow self-imposed regu-
lations," producing an irrevocable error to the detriment of the benefi-
ciaries of the regulatory program, with no serious adverse "ramifications 
on the public fisc" involved in remedying the error.181 The distinction be-
tween requiring an agency to adhere to its regulations and binding the 
agency to representations it. bad made is a close one, particularly when 
the action the affected party wants the agency to take is something the 
agency was authorized to do. The Payne decision suggests that, whenever 
possible, it is advisable to present the challenge in terms of forcing the 
agency to adhere to its own regulations rather than estopping the 
government. 
Right to Counsel. In Smith v. Schweiker, 140 the court emphasized 
that a claimant in a Social Security hearing must be given adequate nO-
tice that he has a right to be represented by coun8el. The Eleventh Cir-
cuit held in Smith, however, that the performance of the ALJ presiding 
at the hearing removed whatever prejudice the unrepresented claimant 
might otherwise have suffered due to the inadequacy of notice.141 The 
court noted that the length of the hearing,1" 1 the care with which the ALJ 
involved the claimant in the development of the evidence, and the com-
pleteness of the findings and reasons for the decision ua combined to per-
suade the court that presence of counsel would not have provided any 
substantial advantage to the claimant.•u The role of the ALJ in the 
Smith case can be contrasted with that of the presiding officer in Walden 
v. Schweiker.1' 1 As in Smith, the clainiant in Walden was not represented 
by counsel in the hearing, but unlike Smith, the bearing in Walden lasted 
only fifteen minutes, the agency asked no questions and presented no wit-
nesses, 1" and the ALJ issued inadequate findings.1" 7 · 
137. 714 F.2d at 1517-18. 
138. ld. 
139. ld. at 1518. 
140. 677 F.2d 826 (11th Cir. 1982). 
141. ld. at 829-30. 
142. The hearing laated nearly one and one-half hours. ld. at 829. 
143. See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
144. 677 F .2d at 829-30. 
145. 672 F.2d 835 (11th Cir. 1982). 
146. ld. at 837 n.2. 
147. ld. at 839-40. 
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E. Administrative Review 
Jurisdiction and Timing of Administrative AppeaL In two cases 
raising fairly technical issues of the jurisdiction and timeliness of admin-
istrative appeals, the Eleventh Circuit adopted common sense solutions ro 
the problems presented. In McHenry v. Bond,"'• the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration (FAA) bad denied a commercial pilot's recertification. The 
pilot petitioned for review by the National Transportation Safety Board 
(NTSB)!48 Mter an ALJ ruled in favor of the pilot, the FAA filed a no-
tice of appeal with the NTSB, which reversed the decision of the ALJt1110 
One of the issues presented to the Eleventh Circuit in the pilot's chal-
lenge of the Board's decision was the timeliness of the FAA's notice of 
appeal to the NTSB .... The applicable regulations required the filing of a 
notice of appeal within ten days after service of the written decision, with 
filing accomplished by personal delivery or by mail. If a timely notice of 
appeal is not filed, the decision of the ALJ becomes final.ua The notice 
filed by the FAA was dated the last day for filing, but did not receive a 
postmark because it was mailed in a franked government envelope. The 
NTSB did not receive the notice until five days after the last day for 
timely filing. The Board held that the notice was timely filed, refusing to 
require notice sent by mail to be postmarked within the ten day period.1118 
That decision was upheld by the Eleventh Circuit, which concluded not 
only that the Board had made a reasonable interpretation of its regula-
tions, but also that the agency's interpretation promoted an essential pol-
icy that an agency charged with protecting the safety of the public ought 
to decide cases on the merits rather than on procedural technicalities.114 
In Bray v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs,1n the 
Eleventh Circuit held that an agency had jurisdiction over an administra-
tive appeal, but in this case the court did so in spite of an agency decision 
that it did not have jurisdiction.116 A deputy commissioner held in 1980 
that an award of benefits made to Bray under a 1969 order had reached 
the statutory limit on aggregate benefits. When Bray appealed that ruling 
to the Benefits Review Board, the Board dismissed the appeal, asserting 
that it lacked jurisdiction to hear an appeal on the interpretation of the 
148. 668 F.2d 1185 (11th Cir. 1982). 
149. ld. at 1187. 
150. ld. at 1189. 
151. Id. at 1194. 
152. Id. 
153. ld. at 1195. 
154. ld. at 1195 & n.ll. 
155. 664 F.2d 1045 (5th Cir. 1981) (Unit 8). 
156. Id. at 1048. 
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amount due under the language of a compensation order.1117 The court 
adopted a pragmatic characterization of Bray's proceeding before the 
Board, deciding that Bray was not asserting any error of law or fact in the 
1969 order, and thus his challenge did not fall into the category of deci· 
sions subject to the requirement to assert the error within thirty days of 
the error.1118 Instead, Bray was seeking the clarification of an ambiguity 
that had arisen in the implementation of the 1969 order, and the 1980 
determination was a supplementary order in an appropriate administra· 
tive proceeding to resolve questions that arise during the period of pay· 
ment. Characterizing the 1980 decision as a supplementary order meant 
that the Benefits Review Board was authorized to hear an appeal raising 
substantial questions of law or fact concerning that order.1119 The court's 
decision accomplishes a number of worthy goals: it recognizes that there 
is an administrative channel for clarification of ambiguities that are re· 
vealed while a compensation order is in effect, it provides for an adminis· 
trative appeal from decisions made within that channel, and it helps to 
keep the district courts from having to decide questions that are ad· 
dressed more appropriately to the administrative tribunals that have the 
most experience and expertise in the matters. 
Agency Authority on Administrative Review. An ALJ acts in 
some respects as the trial judge in agency adjudications, but administra· 
tive review of ALJ deCisions is not conducted under the saine restrictions 
that govern appellate court review of trial court decisions.160 The most 
frequent issue raised by this state of affairs is whether an agency decision 
contrary to that of the ALJ is supported by substantial evidence.181 An· 
other issue addressed by the Eleventh Circuit in Thornton u. United 
States Department of Agriculture, u•• concerned the enhancement of pen· 
alties on administrative review of an ALJ decision. Initially fined two 
thousand dollars for violation of the Horse Protection Act, Thornton was 
additionally disqualified for one year by the agency official to whom he 
appealed.168 The court affirmed that penalty, analogizing the administra-
tive appeal to a judicial retrial, and drew on Supreme Court authority1" 
that permitted the imposition of a new sentence, even if greater than the 
original, in the event of retrial. 1611 
157. ld. at 1046. 
158. ld. at 1047. 
159. ld. at 1047-48. 
160. See 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (1982). 
161. See infra text accompanying notes 335-44. 
162. 715 F.2d 1508 (11th Cir. 1983). 
163. ld. at 1510. 
164. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 723 (1969). 
165. 715 F.2d at 1513. 
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F. Costs and Fees 
The Eleventh Circuit had two opportunities to consider the award of 
fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act.166 In Donovan v. Dilling-
ham, 117 the agency's position on the merits of the controversy was con-
trary to a 1980 decision of the Fifth Circuit.1" Concluding that it was 
bound by that decision, 1111 the Eleventh Circuit held that the agency's po-
sition was nevertheless substantially justified, and thus was not a basis 
for an award of fees under the statute.170 The cou~:t based its characteri-
zation of the justifiability of the agency position on the grounds that the 
agency could not be expected to anticipate the holding of the Fifth Cir-
cuit case, the basis of that holding, or the binding effect of that holding 
on the newly formed Eleventh Circuit.m 
Greater predictive abilities were required of the agency in Enerhaul, 
Inc. v. NLRB.m The Eleventh Circuit interpreted the Equal Access to 
Justice Act as imposing on the agency the burden of 'proving that a fee 
award should not be made when the agency does not prevail in an adver-
sary adjudication conducted by the agency.178 The court found no support 
in the case law of the circuit for the position taken by the agency; instead, 
the court found that the agency relied "on a legal theory that has been 
clearly. and repeatedly rejected by this Court,"17" and held that the 
agency had not sustained its burden and thus the petition for fees had 
been erroneously dismissed.175 
Fees and cost issues can arise in an administrative law context not gov-
erned by the Equal Access to Justice Act. When a party prevails in a 
state administrative proceeding and has been made whole in that pro-
ceeding, the court in Estes v. Tuscaloosa County176 held that section 
1988177 does not authorize an award of attorneys' fees for representation 
in that proceeding.171 
166. See 5 U.S.C. § 504 (1982), 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (Supp. V 1981). 
167. 668 F.2d 1196, reu'd on reh'g on other grounds, 688 F.2d 1367 (11th Cir. 1982) . 
. 168. Taggart Corp. v. Life & Health Benefits Admin., 617 F.2d 1208 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. 
denied, 450 U.S. 1030 (1981). 
169. 668 F.2d at 1197. 
170. Id. at 1199. 
171. ld. Another court of appeals has read Donovan with approval as an indication that 
the Eleventh Circuit ia applying a reasonableness test. See Foster v. Tourtellotte, 704 F.2d 
1109, 1112 (9th Cir. 1983). 
172. 710 F.2d 748 (11th Cir. 1983). 
173. ld. at 750. 
174. Id. at 751. 
175. ld. 
176. 696 F.2d 898 (11th Cir. 1983). 
177. 42 u.s.c. § 1988 (1976). 
178. 696 F.2d at 901. Another court of appeals seems to have read this decision too 
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G. Administrative Search and Seizure 
Authority to review the legitimacy of administrative searches and 
seizures was addressed in two Eleventh Circuit cases. Donovan v. Sara-
sota Concrete Co. 178 presented the issue of the agency's competence to 
make fourth amendment determinations in the course of an adjudicative 
proceeding. A federal magistrate had issued an administrative inspection 
warrant at the request of the Occupational Safety and Health Adminis-
tration {OSHA).180 After Sarasota Concrete was cited by OSHA for viola-
tions discovered during the search .conducted pursuant to the warrant, 
the company moved to suppress all the evidence gathered in the search 
that exceeded the scope of the original complaint on which the warrant 
application had been based.181 The ALJ and, on review, the Occupational 
Safety Health Review Commission evaluated the sufficiency of the evi-
dence to support a full scope inspection warrant, and concluded that the 
specific employee complaint in this case did not proVide probable cause 
for the investigation.181 OSHA's decision to apply an exclusionary rule, 
and its refusal to incorporate a good faith exception to the rule, were up-
held by the Eleventh Circuit.••• 
In Federal Election Commission v. Florida for Kennedy Committee, 184 
the Eleventh Circuit considered how courts should evaluate administra-
tive subpoenas. The district court's enforcement1" of a Federal Election 
Commission (FEC) subpoena was reversed on the ground that the agency 
lacked jurisdiction over the matters sought in the subpoena.••• The Elev-
enth Circuit acknowledged the Morton Salt rule187 that limits the judicial 
scrutiny of administrative subpoenas, but noted that the rule was a judi-
cially self-imposed restraint that could be overriden by countervailing 
broadly. In Webb v. County Bd. of Educ., 715 F.2d 254 (6th Cir. 1983), Estes was cited in 
support of the proposition that section 1988 does not create an independent cause of action 
for attorneys' fees for services performed in optional administrative proceedings. ld. at 257. 
Nothing in the district court's memorandum opinion adopted by the Eleventh Circuit indi-
cates whether the administrative proceedings invoked by Estes were optional, or, if they 
were in fact optional, whether that played a part in the court's decision of the section 1988 
issue. 
179. 693 F.2d 1061 (11th Cir. 1982). 
180.· ld. at 1063. 
181. ld. at 1064. 
182. ld. at 1064-65. 
183. ld. at 1063, 1066. 
184. 681 F.2d 1281 (11th Cir. 1982). 
185. Federal Election Comm'n v. Florida For Kennedy Comm., 492 F. Supp. 587 (S.D. 
Fla. 1980). 
186. 681 F.2d at 1282. 
187. See United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950). 
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considerations.188 Among the factors calling for a higher degree of scru-
tiny in this case were the substantial risks of government infringement of 
political expression involved in FEC subpoenas, 1811 and the absence of a 
need for any further factual development in order to decide the question 
of the agency's authority to issue this subpoena.180 Freed from the re-
straints of the Morton Salt rule, the court concluded, after careful scru-
tiny, that the agency did not have jurisdiction to investigate the Commit-
tee's activities on behalf of a noncandidate.1111 
H. Freedom of Information Act 
The Eleventh Circuit considered two of the exemptions found in the 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. 
United States Small Business Administration, 1111 and found neither ex-
emption applicable to the agency information sought by the newspaper.1113 
The requests at issue pertained to advance payments and loans made by 
the agency. The agency declined to release information that would per-
sonally identify borrowers or provide the current status of loans and ad-
vances, basing its refusal on Exemption 4,1114 commercial or financial in-
formation, and Exemption 6,1115 personnel and similar files leading to 
unwarranted .invasion of personal privacy. 
In response to the Exemption 4 argument, the court required the 
agency to establish that disclosure would cause substantial competitive 
injury to an entity in actual competition.1" Characterizing the testimony 
of the agency's district director as "mere unsupported speculation about 
the business world generally, with no focus on small business debtors or 
guaranteed loans in particular,"lll'7 the court of appeals agreed with the 
district court that the agency had not sustained its burden to establish 
the applicability of the exemption.11111 
The court avoided the balancing process of Exemption 6 by a narrow 
interpretation of the kinds of records that met the threshold requirement 
for the exemption. Deciding that the information must invoke privacy in-
terests similar to the privacy interests in personnel and medical files, the 
188. 681 F.2d at 1284. 
189. Id. 
190. Id. at 1285-86. 
191. Id. at 1288. 
192. 670 F.2d 610 (5th Cir. 1982) (Unit B). 
193. Id. at 611. 
194. Id. at 612-13. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1982). 
195. 5 u.s.c. § 552(b)(6) (1982). 
196. 670 F.2d at 613-14. 
197. Id. at 614. 
198. Id. 
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court found no such privacy interest attached to the information sought · 
in this case. The expectation of a delinquent or defaulting borrower was 
that publicity would be given to its status when the lender proceeded 
against the borrower.119 At the heart of the court's test for 'similar files' 
under Exemption 6 is apparently an expectation that the information 
would not be publicly disclosed other than by the FOIA requester.100 
In Chilivis v. SEC,'1101 the co~ reviewed the applicability of Exemption 
5,101 inter-/intra-agency memoranda, and a number of FOIA procedural 
matters. The court held that drafts of complaints and indictments, as 
well as memoranda and lists prepared by attorneys or agency personnel 
under their direction in anticipation of litigation, were exempt as either 
work product or deliberative.108 
A narrow reading of the authorization of an award of attorneys' fees 
kept plaintiff from recovering fees in this case, even though the agency 
did turn over a large number of documents after the FOIA lawsuit had 
been instituted. 104 The court read a causation requirement into the attor-
neys' fees provision, so that a plaintiff must show that the FOIA "lawsuit 
provided the necessary impetus for disclosure. ''206 When the agency re-
leases documents that are no longer exempt due to changed circum-
stances, a showing that the "lawsuit provided the necessary impetus for 
disclosure" will not have been made.108 
The court also clarified the relationship between FOIA and the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. The court stated that a motion to dismiss or a 
motion for summary judgement is sufficient to satisfy the FOIA's require-
ment that an agency file an answer or otherwise plead within thirty days 
after service of the complaint.107 Such a motion, however, is not a respon-
sive pleading as that term is used in ·the pleading requirements of the 
Federal Rules, and thus exemptions that are not raised in that initial mo-
tion will not be treated as affirmative defenses that are waived if not in-
cluded in the responsive pleading.108 
199. Id. at 615-16. 
200. ld. at 616 n.ll. 
201. 673 F.2d 1205 (11th Cir. 1982). 
202. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1982). 
203. 673 F.2d at 1211. 
204. Id: at i212. 
205. ld. 
206. ld. at 1212-13. 
207. ld. at 1209. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(C) (1982). 
208. 673 F.2d at 1208-09. 
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II. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS 
A. Jurisdiction to Review Agency Decisions 
The choice of the appropriate forum for judicial review of administra-
tive action is typically not a matter left to the challenger. Enabling legis- · 
lation for agencies and programs often gives a court jurisdiction to review 
particular agency action. Statutory provisions may be confusing when 
they try to distinguish between issues that are to be reviewed by a district 
court and issues that are specifically assigned to the exclusive jurisdiction 
of an appellate court. The interpretive issue then becomes whether the 
challenged agency action is one of those matters singled out for appellate 
court jurisdiction on judicial review. Three decisions of the Eleventh Cir-
cuit dealt with those interpretive issues. 
In Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 1011 the court carved out a narrow 
but potentially significant exception to a statutory requirement that cer-
tain orders in deportation proceedings be reviewed only by a court of ap-
peals. The district court had enjoined further deportation of Haitians un-
til the government submitted and the court approved a plan for 
reprocessing their applications for asylum.110 Relying on a statutory pro-
vision placing jurisdiction in the courts of appeals to review deportation 
orders, the government argued that the district court lacked subject mat-
ter jurisdiction. 111 The Eleventh Circuit upheld the district court's juris-
diction, but pointed out the "factual uniqueness'' of the case, which in-
volved allegations of "a pattern and practice by immigration officials to 
vioiate the constitutional rights of a class of aliens."111 The court distin-
guished between challenges to individual deportation orders and actions 
taken in the deportation proceeding that affect the outcome, which were 
exclusively within the jurisdiction of a court of appeals, and challenges of 
the type before it, which fell within the jurisdiction of a district court "to 
wield its equitable powers when a wholesale, carefully orchestrated, pro-
gram of constitutional violations is alleged. "lllB The court emphasized the 
narrowness of its holding in the immigration context, insisting that the 
statutory review scheme could not be avoided simply by alleging that a 
proce.dural ruling was constitutionally impermissible.• .. The significance 
of this decision may extend beyond the immigration area, if statutes vest-
209. 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1982) (Unit B), aff'g & modifying sub nom Haitian Refugee 
Center v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442 (S.D. Fla. 1980). 
210. 676 F.2d at 1027. 
211. ld. 
212. 676 F.2d at 1033. 
213. ld. 
214. ld. 
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ing judicial review exclusively within the appellate courts now may not 
stand in the way of the type of challenge that was raised by the plaintiffs 
in this case. 
The characterization of different types of agency decisions was crucial 
to the jurisdictional determination in Georgia Department of Medical 
Assistance v. United States Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices. 1111 'Noncompliance' decisions••• are within the judicial review of the 
courts of appeals, but no such statutory review provision governs 'disal-
lowance' decisions.11" Noting that the decision being challenged in this 
review proceeding instituted in the court of appeals had some of the char-
acteristics of both categories, the court characterized the Department of 
Health and Human Services' decision as a disallowance and thus resolved 
the jurisdictional issue by focussing on the policies served by performing 
judicial review in trial rather than appella~ courts.118 The major factor in 
favor of direct appellate court review is the adverse impact of the admin-
istrative agency decision. When the decision, as here, did not affect the 
design or administration of a state's plan, and did not lead to a halt of 
federal funds, the necessity for speed in judicial review was less compel-
ling.111 The Eleventh Circuit's use of a functional rather than a concep-
tual approach to the characterization of the administrative decision in 
this case offers a useful model for similar jurisdictional issues under other 
statutory review schemes. 
In a Federal Tort Claims Act case, the Eleventh Circuit considered the 
jurisdictional prerequisite of the presentation of the claim to the adminis-
trative agency that allegedly committed the tort.1110 Bush v. United 
States••• was a medical malpractice action based on the negligence of 
Veterans Administration surgeons who had operated on plaintiff's hus-
band.122 The district court took a very narrow approach to the filing re-
quirement, concluding that it had no jurisdiction to decide questions 
215. 708 F .2d 627 (11th Cir. 1983). 
216. The court referred to noncompliance decisions as involving "a determination that 
the state's overall rate methodology has been so changed that it no longer complies with 
federal requirements or that the state's administration of its plan violates federal require-
ments." I d. at 628. 
217. Id. Disallowance decisions typically involve a "technical audit dispute concerning 
specific and isolated payments." Id. The distinction thus seems to be between programmatic 
violations and individual errors. 
218. Id. at 628-30. The best treatment of those policies is Currie & Goodman, Judicial 
Reuiew of Federal Administratiue Action: Quest for the Optimum Forum, 75 CoLuM. L. 
REv. 1 (1975). 
219. 708 F .2d at 630. 
220. See 28 U.S.C. § 2675 (1976). 
221. 703 F.2d 491 (11th Cir. 1983). 
222. Id. at 493. 
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presented by the theories of recovery that plaintiff had not put forth in 
her administrative claim. 1113 The Eleventh Circuit corrected the district 
court's view of the prerequisite, stating that the requirement was ~atisfied 
as long as the administrative claim put the government on notice that a 
particular set of facts gives plaintiff a right to recover.••• The court's 
treatment of this issue, and its application of the test in the instant case, 
is a sensible approach analogous to the general move away from fact or 
issue pleading and toward notice pleading in the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 11' 
B. Nonreviewability 
Certain administrative agency decisions have been shielded from judi-
cial scrutiny by legislative preclusion of judicial review. A number of 
those preclusion provisions were invoked to prevent judicial review in 
cases presented to the Eleventh Circuit. 
The most difficult preclusion cases are those involving apparently con-
flicting statutory provisions in which one statute gives broad authority for 
judicial review and the other withdraws such authority. The Eleventh 
Circuit resolved that type of conflict in McCard v. Merit Systems Protec-
tion Board••• by concluding that the two provisions, read together, oper-
ated to narrow but not foreclose judicial review. McCard applied for disa-
bility retirement, but his application was disapproved by the Office of 
Personnel Management.117 The Merit Systems Protection Board denied 
his petition for review, and McCard sought judicial review in the appel-
late court.••• One statutory provision provided for judicial review of final 
orders of the Board.111 Another declared the Board's decision final and 
not subject to re.view.180 The Eleventh Circuit rejected the total preclu-
sion argument of the Board, deciding instead that the legislative intent of 
the latter provision was to narrow judicial review rather than forbid it.181 
The court's decision is consistent with the principle that strong evidence 
of preclusive intent is necessary for courts to close all ayenues of judicial 
review to parties aggrieved by administrative action. 
Evidence of preclusive intent was found by the court in the statutory 
223. /d. at 494. 
224. /d. 
225. See generally J. MooRE & J. LucAS, 2A MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 11 8.13 (2d ed. 
1983). 
226. 702 F.2d 978 (11th Cir. 1983). 
227. /d. at 979. 
228. /d. at 980. 
229. See 5 U.S.C. § 7703 (1982). 
230. See 5 U.S.C. § 8347(c) (1982). 
231. 702 F.2d at 981-82. 
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prov1s1on in V.N.A. of Greater Tift County, Inc. v. Heckler.181 A better 
reading of the statutory provision, however, would have led to the conclu-
sion that the provision actually imposes a specific exhaustion requirement 
rather than preclusion of judicial review. V.N.A. objected to a determina-
tion that it had received a Medicare overpayment, and simultaneously 
filed for administrative and judicial review of the decision.188 The court 
noted the broad preclusive language of one statutory provision,184 but fur-
ther noted that the language must be read in light of another provision8811 
that permits judicial review of final decisions of the administrative agency 
to which V.N.A. had appealed the overpayment determination.•" The 
court then concluded that the effect of the two provisions was to preclude 
review of Medicare reimbursement decisions until the administrative 
agency has issued its decision in the matter.l187 That treatment of the 
statutory provisions can easily be recast as a requirement that challengers 
of reimbursement decisions must exhaust the administrative appeal rem-
edy before obtaining judicial review. The statutes probably should be in-
terpreted as making the exhaustion requirement.& jurisdictional prerequi-
site rather than a matter of judicial self-restraint.138 
A different kind of Medicare provider, not specifically covered by the 
provision allowing judicial review after an administrative appeal of reim-
bursement decisions,••• was subject to the full force of the general preclu-
sion provision of the Medicare Act.140 In United States v. Sanet,141 the 
government had sued to recover overpayment made to Sanet. The Elev-
enth Circuit held that judicial review of the method of determining the 
amount of overpayment was precluded by the general preclusion provi-
sion, and that Sanet could not assert a challenge to that method in the 
action filed by the agency to recover the overpayments. 141 The proper 
procedure would ·have been for Sanet to pay the contested amount and 
then bring an action for repayment in the Court of Claims.1148 Becaus~ 
232. 711 F.2d 1020 (11th Cir. 1983). 
233. The judicial· action sought to enjoin suspension of payments pending the adminis-
trative review decision. ld. at 1024. That aspect of the case is discussed infra at notes 307-
14. 
234. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (1976). The Medicare Act, by 42 U.S.C. § 1395ii (Supp. V 
1981), incorporates the preclusion provisiop in 42 U.S.C. § 405(h). 
235. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(f)(1) (Supp. V 1981). 
236. 7ll'F.2d at 1024. 
237. ld. at 1025. 
238. See infra notes 256-60 and accompanying text. 
239. See supra note 235. 
240. See supra note 234. 
241. 666 F.2d 1370 (11th Cir. 1982). 
242. ld. at 1375. 
243. ld. at 1374-75. 
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there was an avenue by which Sanet could have presented his challenge 
to a judicial tribunal, the court was not forced to decide whether the chal-
lenge could be totally barred from judicial consideration. 
When an agency, whose decisions are generally precluded from judicial 
review, issues regulations that will be used in making individual decisions, 
the Eleventh Circuit has indicated that the preclusion will not extend to 
the regulations. In Memorial Hospital v. Heckler,14" the court distin-
guished agency policy decisions about Medicare reimbursement that were 
embodied in agency regulations from individual decisions concerning re-
imbursement.••• The court then concluded that the agency could not 
close the administrative and judicial review channels that were available 
after individual decisions148 by issuing supposedly nonreviewable regula-
tions that removed a class of decisions from those channels.14" The Elev-
enth Circuit, in trying to find a way to avoid the total elimination of judi-
cial consideration of a matter entrusted to the agency~ held that the 
regulations were reviewable under an "arbitrary and capricious" standard 
of review.148 
C. Exhaustion · 
In half a dozen decisions during the last two years, the Eleventh Circuit 
dealt with the requirement that, before obtaining judicial review, an ag-
grieved party must exhaust available administrative remedies. In none of 
these decisions did the court break new theoretical ground, but the 
court's consistent approach to exhaustion was to base its decision on a 
so~d consideration of the policy objectives of the exhaustion require-
ment. Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith148 is typical of the court's ap-
proach. The court decided in Haitian Refugee Center that plaintiffs did 
not have to exhaust their administrative remedies ·on the rationale that 
the policies served by exhaustion were not thwarted by immediate judi-
cial consideration of the claims.1150 The standard exceptions to the exhaus-
tion requirement were enunciated in Deltona Corp. v. Alexander. 811 None 
244. 706 F.2d 1130 (11th Cir. 1983). 
245. I d. at 1133. 
246. See supra notes 232-37 and accompanying text. 
247. 706 F.2d at 1133. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(g) (Supp. V 1981). 
248. 706 F.2d at 1133. 
249. 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1982) (Unit B). 
250. ld. at 1034-35. The poli~es the court identified were: (1) to allow the agency to 
develop a more complete factual record; (2) to permit the exercise of agency discretion and 
expertise on issues requiring this; (3) to prevent the deliberate disregard and circumvention 
of established agency procedures; and (4) to enhance judicial efficiency and eliminate the 
need for judicial vindication of legal rights by giving the agency the first opportunity to 
correct any error. ld. at 1034. 
251. 682 F.2d 888, 893 (11th Cir. 1982). 
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of the exceptions, however, were found applicable in that case, and the 
policies supporting exhaustion were strong enough to lead the court to 
avoid deciding the issue before the agency had acted. ''1 
The same exceptions were held not to apply in Linfors v. United 
States,'" when the.court required a Coast Guard officer to pursue admin-
istrative review of a denial of his request for retirement credit for his 
service academy years. Because the original decision was based on estab-
lished Coast Guard policy,,.,.. and the next reviewing body appeared to be 
engaged mainly in a ministerial correction of service records, 1" the real 
purpose of requiring exhaustion in this case would seem to be to give the 
Secretary of Transportation, the person with ultimate administrative au-
thority, an opportunity to become aware of the retirement credit policy 
and decide whether to maintain it. Thus, the decision to require exhaus-
tion does have functional support, even though the court did not ade-
quately outline that support. 
Needless confusion about whether exhaustion is a jurisdictional re-
quirement might be avoided by analysis of the underlying statutory pro-
vision for judicial review. The court has stated that exhaustion is not ju-
risdictional, ne but is more in the nature of an affirmative defense that 
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.1" Those statements find 
support in the leading administrative law treatises.•" But when judicial 
review is contingent upon an administrative review procedure, as is the 
case in Medicare reimbursement claims,•"• or when a judicial review pro-
vision requires an objection to be presented to ~he agency,aeo compliance 
with the statute may easily be viewed as a statutory jurisdictional ana-
logue to exhaustion. 
In Patsy v. Board of Regents, 111 the Supreme Court held a section 1983 
plaintiff was not required to exhaust administrative remedies as a prereq-
uisite to the civil rights action.•• The Eleventh Circuit in Gleason v. Mal-
. 252. /d. at 893-94. 
253. 673 F.2d 332 (11th Cir. 1982). . 
254. /d. at 333. In Jacobs v. United States, 680 F.2d 88 (9th Cir. 1982), the Ninth Circuit 
found that a Coast Guard Commandant's act of informing an officer that the denial of a 
request identical to Linfors' was administratively final was sufficient to satisfy whatever 
exhaustion requirements were applicable. 680 F.2d at 88 n.l. 
255. See 673 F.2d at 334, for the regulation setting out the function of the Board for 
Correction of Military Records. · 
256. Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d at 1034. 
257. Dougherty County School Sys. v. Bell, 694 F.2d 78, 80 (5th Cir. 1982) (Former 5th). 
258. See, e.g., 4 K. DAvtS, supra note 124, § 26:15; B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 9, at 502-03. 
259. See supra notes 282-38 and accompanying text. 
260. Power Plant Div., Brown & Root, Inc. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review 
Comm'n, 673 F.2d 111, 114 (5th Cir. 1982) (Unit B). 
261. 457 u.s. 496 (1982). 
262. /d. at 500-01. 
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com283 did not extend the Patsy rationale to a plaintiff bringing a Bivens-
type constitutional tort action.•" The court in Gleason affirmed the dis-
trict court's dismissal of the Bivens-type claim, stating that such claims 
"are somewhat extraordinary and are restricted to the vindication of the 
constitutional rights of an aggrieved victim only when no equally effective 
remedy is available,"118' and that the federal employee plaintiff should not 
be permitted to "bypass comprehensive and carefully balanced statutory 
and administrative remedies in order to seek direct judicial relief.''"' 
D. Timeliness of Judicial Review 
Statutory requirements that judicial review of agency action must be 
sought within a specified period of time are often strictly construed, and 
compliance may be treated as a jurisdictional prerequisite!87 In Hatchell 
v. Heckler, 188 the Eleventh Circuit took the reasonable approach that sub-
stantial compliance with the timing provision had been established. Pa- · 
pel'S had been received, but not filed, by the district court clerk within 
the appropriate time, and apparently the only reason for not filing was 
the absence of ·a supporting affidavit along with the pro se claimant's own 
affidavit of insolvency in his petition to proceed in forma pauperis.169 
Tortuous reasoning was employed by the court in Bloodworth v. Heck-
ler, 170 when the court distinguished Social Security Administration Ap-
peals Council denials of requests for review from that Council's denials of 
requests to reopen. The former type of denial, which was before the court, 
was held to be final agency action that triggered the sixty-day time limit 
for . judicial review in a federal district court.171 The characterization 
based on that distinction enabled the court to preserve the claimant's op-
portunity for judicial review of the agency action.171 
E. Finality 
Judicial review is normally only available, and only appropriate, when 
the agency has rendered a decision that is final, but what constitutes 
finality is sometimes a matter that requires careful analysis. The court's 
263. 718 F.2d 1044 (11th Cir. 1983). 
264. I d. at 1048. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 
403 u.s. 388 (1971). 
265. Id. at 1047. 
266. Id. at 1048. 
267. See B. ScHWARTZ, supra note 9, § 8.3, at 440. 
268. 708 F.2d 578 (11th Cir. 1983). 
269. Id. at 579. 
270. 703 F.2d 1233 (11th Cir. 1983). 
271. ld. at 1237. 
272. Id. at 1239. 
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analysis in City of Miami v. ICC178 was essentially technical rather than 
pragmatic in reaching the conclusion that an ICC order was not final. The 
agency had issued a declaratory order that a railroad facility was a 'line of 
railroad,' and thus subject to agency jurisdiction.1174 In deciding that it 
had no jurisdiction because there had been no final agency action, the 
court of appeals decided that the ICC order, in and of itself, did not pro-
duce any necessary legal consequences.•.,. The court adopted an exceed-
ingly narrow view of the 'necessity' of legal consequences. The ICC dis-
continued its proceedings after issuing the order in question. 
Furthermore, the ICC decision would almost certainly be employed in 
state court proceedings concerning the City's attempt to condemn the fa-
cility in question. The court would have done well to focus on the practi-
cal effects, in a manner such as that developed under certain provisions of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.178 
Questions of finality can arise when the initiaJ judicial review of agency 
action occurs in a federal district court. In Howell v. Schweiker/m the 
court held that it did not have jUl'isdiction of an appeal from a district 
court order remanding a case to the Social Security Administration for· 
determination of whether a disability benefit claimant was fit for substan-
tial gainful activity in something other than his previous employment. 178 
Because the agency had first determined that the applicant was not dis-· 
abled, this specific question had not been considered by the agency.S7' 
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district court's order of remand 
was not appealable because the district court order was not a final order 
terminating the litigation. Further judicial review would lie only from the· 
action of the agency in denying the benefits, if that was in fact the 
agency's decision on remand from the district court.118° From the stand-
point of agency action, there had been no final agency action on the issue 
of whether the disabled claimant was fit for other employment, so further 
judicial review of that matter in a court of appeals was correctly consid-
ered inappropriate. 
F. Ripeness 
Preenforcement review of administrative action often raises the issue of 
whether the agency action is ripe for judicial review. The guiding princi-
273. 669 F.2d 219 (5th Cir. 1982) (Unit B). 
274. Id. at 219. 
275. Id. at 221-22. 
276. See, e.6., FED. R. CIV. P. 19 & 24 and accompanying Advisory Committee Notes. 
277. 699 F.2d 524 (11th Cir. 1983). 
278. Id. at 526-27. 
279. Id. at 527. 
280. Id. at 526. 
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pies are still those set out by the Supreme Court in Abbott Laboratories 
v. Gardner/'81 and the Eleventh Circuit fairly routinely resolves its ripe-
ness issues by using those principles. Three different constitutional chal-
lenges were made to provisions of the Power Plant and Industrial Fuel 
Act of 19781181 and its accompanying Department of Energy regulations. 
In Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. United States Department of Energy,1188 the 
Eleventh Circuit found two of the three challenges ripe for judicial resolu-
tion. The commerce clause and tenth amendment attacks were ripe be-
cause the nature of the challenge was unlikely tQ change as a result of 
actual prosecution, and the parties before the court were the most appro-
priate parties to raise the objections, because fines would be levied 
against them.184 A due process vagueness challenge was not ripe, however. 
The court read the statute as delegating primary regulatory authority to 
the states, and until a state actually promulgated a regulatory program, 
claims that the regulations would be vague and uncertain were prema-
ture.186 This decision appears to be a straightforward application of the 
finality prong of the Abbott Laboratories ripeness test,186 but it does have 
interesting federalism overtones. When federal regulatory programs have 
state implementation components,187 judicial review will be bifurcated on 
ripeness grounds, with challenges to state implementation plans post-
poned until those plans are actually in place. 
The finality factor of ripeness was decisive in Placid Oil Co. v. Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission, 1186 in which the court's decision that a 
procedural order was not ripe for review preserved the challenger's oppor-
tunity to obtain judicial review of the agency's denial of the individual 
application under the procedure established by the order.•• Until action 
occurred on that application, there was no assurance that there would be 
an adverse impact on the applicant.180 Placid Oil can be contrasted with 
Alabama Power Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,m in 
which the court concluded that a declaratory ruling was ripe for review 
because of the direct and immediate impact the order would have.•" 
281. 387 u.s. 136 (1967). 
282. 42 U.S.C. §§ 8301-8484 (Supp. V 1981). 
283. 666 F.2d 1359 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 103. S. Ct. 81 (1982). 
284. 666 F.2d at 1363 n.7, 1368 n.l6. 
285. /d. at 1370. 
286. 387 U.S. at 148-56. 
287. This is the case under much of the federal environmental protection legislation. 
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410, 74ll(c), 7412(d) (Supp. V 1981). 
288. 666 F.2d 976 (5th Cir. 1982) (Former 5th). 
. 289. /d. at 980-81. 
290. /d. at 981. 
291. 685 F.2d 1311 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3573 (1983). 
292. 685 F.2d at 1315. 
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G. Mootness 
The Eleventh Circuit's decision in Alabama Hospital Association v. 
Beasley198 demonstrated how administrative action can render previously 
viable challenges moot. While the case was pending, the agency amended 
its regulation to correct one of the deficiencies that had been pointed out 
by the challengers. 1" The possibility that the agency might rescind the 
amendment to the regulations was insufficient to make the challenge 'live' 
again, at least in part because of the adequacy of a post-rescission oppor-
tunity to challenge the plan.1' 1 
H. Standing 
Few matters of administrative law are as little understood by courts as 
the issue of whether a particular person has standing to challenge an ad-
ministrative agency decision. In R.T. Vanderbilt Co. v. Occupational 
Safety & Health Review Commission,•" the Eleventh Circuit fell into 
precisely the kind of analytical confusion this author has recently warned 
against/'" The court's opinion treats as a standing issue the question of 
whether a supplier "has a right of action under the Occupational Safety 
and Health Act."1" This may sometimes be a legitimate inquiry, and the 
court may very well be correct on this issue when it decides there is no 
right of action; however, the crucial point is that this is not a question of 
'standing. '1" Indeed, one could argue that whether a party has a right of 
action is not an appropriate question when considering a petition for re-
view in a court of. appeals under a broad "person adversely affected or 
aggrieved" statutory review provision ·such as was av;ailabl~_in this case.800 
What the court was apparently attempting to do was apply the 'zone of 
interest' test of Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v. 
Camp.801 That portion of·the standing test is probably now defunct,aos 
but in any event it is not a test 'that turns on whether the "litigant pos-
sesses a right of action."808 The correct interpretation of the statutory 
provision is that it displays a Congressional intent to lift all but the con-
293. 702 F.2d 955 (11th Cir. 1983). 
294. /d. at 957. 
295. /d. at 961. 
296. 708 F.2d 570 (11th Cir. 1983). 
297. See LeBel, Standing After Havens Realty: A Critique and an Alternative Frame-
work for Analysis, 1982 Duu L.J. 1013. 
298. 708 F.2d at 574. 
299. See LeBel, supra note 297, at 1016-32. 
300. See 29 U.S.C. § 660(a) (1976). See generally LeBel, supra note 297, at 1037-49. 
301. 397 u.s. 150, 153-56 (1970). 
302. See generally 4 K. DAVIS, supra note 124, § 24:17. 
303. 708 F.2d at 574. 
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stitutional barriers to standing, and thus would support the petitioner's 
standing in this case. 
In Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. United States Department of Energy,3o. 
the court engaged in a more expansive standing analysis. In deciding that 
local gas distribution companies had standing to assert constitutional 
challenges to statutory and regulatory provisions limiting the sale of nat-
ural gas for certain uses, the court took a relaxed view of the injury-in-
fact test for the constitutional aspect ·of standing to raise commerce 
clause issues, 306 and extended that reasoning to recognize standing to as-
sert a tenth amendment challenge as well. 306 
I. Stay of Agency Action Pending Judicial Review 
One problem faced by parties seeking judicial review of agency action is 
the possible adverse impact the administrative decision can have while 
the judicial review process is under way. A restricted view of the availa-
bility of interim relief pending the completion of administrative and judi-
cial review was displayed in V.N.A. of Greater Tift County, Inc. v. Heck-
ler,307 when the court refused to approve an injunction sought by a health 
care provider who was subject to a suspension of Medicare funds for an 
alleged overpayment. 308 The court adapted to the Medicare context the 
analysis used by the Supreme Court in Sampson v. Murray,809 focussing 
not only on whether a refusal to grant the injunction would defeat the 
reviewing court's jurisdiction, but also on the Congressional intent with 
regard to injunctions that stayed agency action pending judicial review.310 
The Eleventh Circuit decided that the Murray analysis as applied to this 
case called for a heightened showing on each of the four factors tradition-
ally used to decide whether to grant a status quo injunction: (1) 
probability of success on the merits, (2) harm to other parties, (3) the 
public interest, and (4) irreparable injury.S11 Measured against the "new 
way of analyzing" the traditional factors,318 V.N.A.'s showing was insuffi-
cient to entitle it to the injunction it sought.S13 Chief Judge Godbold, in 
his dissent, criticized the majority for its overly technical interpretation 
304. 666 F.2d 1359 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 81 (1982). 
305. 666 F.2d at 1363 n.7. 
306. /d. at 1368 n.16. 
307. 711 F.2d 1020 (11th Cir. 1983). 
308. /d. at 1022. 
309. 415 u.s. 61 (1974). 
310. 711 F.2d at 1029. 
311. /d. at 1030. 
312. /d. 
313. /d. at 1034-35. 
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of the defeat of the jurisdiction factor from the Murray analysis,814 and 
would have permitted the district court to use the traditional test without 
any added burden 9n the challenger trying to enjoin the agency from sus-
pending its payments while judicial review took place. 
J. Judicial Remedy for Agency Error 
A number of Eleventh Circuit decisions addressed the question of what 
power a reviewing court possesses and should exercise after an adminis-
trative agency decision has been found to be erroneous or unauthorized. 
The results the court reached were in each instance a predictable and 
sensible disposition. of the case. 
When an agency operates under a two-part legal standard, in which 
reaching the second part is contingent on an affirmative finding on the 
first part, then the agency can dispose of the matter by a negative finding 
on the first issue without ever reaching the second issue. Such is the case 
in Social Security Administration disability benefit cases, and the ques-
tion raised is what disposition should be made if the reviewing court 
reverses the agency's negative finding on the first issue of whether the 
claimant is disabled. In Boyd v. Heckler,81" the Eleventh Circuit held that 
the proper course of action was for the district court to remand the case 
to the agency.818 On remand, the .agency could exercise its statutory au-
thority on the issue of whether the claimant could perform alternative 
employment that was available in the national economy, which the 
agency originally had no need to reach.Sn Another possible solution that 
would also uphold the agency authority would be for the court to en-
courage the agency to make contingent findings on the second issue in 
case the disability issue were to be reversed by the reviewing court. This 
procedure is analogous to a trial court's rulings on conditional new trial 
and judgment notwithstanding the verdict motions••• and would save 
time in the individual case that was reversed. This procedure, however, 
might add substantially to the burden on an agency already engaged in 
processing a high volume workload. 
In two decisions, the Eleventh Circuit rejected arguments that the spe-
cific remedial action it proposed was beyond the court's authority. In 
Payne v. Block,••• the court held that the agency failed to issue proper 
public notice of the availability of federal disaster relief funds. 810 The 
314. ld. at 1035-37 (Godbold, C.J., dissenting). 
315. 704 F.2d 1207 (11th Cir. 1983). 
316. ld. at 1211. 
317. ld. 
318. See FBD. R. CIV. P. 50(c)-(d). 
319. 714 F.2d 1510 (11th Cir. 1983). 
320. ld. at 1520. 
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court took the pragmatic approach that the only meaningful relief to the 
aggrieved parties who had been denied the opportunity to apply for the 
funds would be to force the agency to extend the application period. sat 
"To hold otherwise," the court said, "would allow [the agency] to totally 
fail to provide notice to congressionally intended potential beneficiaries 
and avoid being called to task for such conduct:•••• In a similarly prag-
matic vein, the court, in Refrigerated Transport Co. v. ICC,813 asserted its 
authority to dire~ the agency to vacate or modify an improperly issued 
certificate of operating authority, because holding otherwise would re-
quire challengers to seek a stay of the issuance of the certificate if they 
were to preserve the reviewing court's ability to grant effective relief."" 
The court found nothing in the statutory scheme that required a chal-
lenger to take that additional step in order to assure that the court would 
have meaningful remedial authority. 818 
A federal court's remedial powers with respect to state administrative 
proceedings were at issue in Baggett v. Department of Professional Regu-
lation, Board of Pilot Commissioners.••• Baggett was licensed as a marine 
pilot by both state and federal authorities; different licenses were re-
quired for different kinds of vessels being piloted. The state agency insti-
tuted disciplinary proceedings for conduct that occurred while Baggett 
was piloting a vessel whose pilotage was exclusively a matter of federal 
control.317 Holding that the state proceeding was beyond the state's regu-
latory authority because of federal preemption, the Eleventh Circuit in-
structed the district court to issue an injunction against the state pro-
ceedings. 318 The dissenting judge disagreed with the majority's finding of 
preemption and thought it would have been appropriate for the district. 
court to abstain so that the preemption . issue could have been decided 
initially in the state proceedings. 318 
In Bray v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs,830 the 
court held that it is a matter for the agency to decide whether new issues 
could be asserted before the agency after the initial reviewing court re-
versed an agency decision because of lack of jurisdiction. The court de-
cided that administrative agencies should possess the same discretionary 
authority that district courts exercise over amendments to pleadings 
321. ld. at 1517. 
322. ld. 
323. 686 F.2d 881 (11th Cir. 1982). 
324. ld. at 889. 
325. ld. at 889-90. 
326. 717 F.2d 521 (11th Cir. 1983). 
327. ld. at 522-23. 
328. ld. at 524. 
329. ld. at 524-25 (Hatchett, C.J., dissenting). · 
330. 664 F.2d 1045 (5th Cir. 1981) (Unit B). 
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when an action has been dismissed for want of jurisdiction and the judg-
ment is later reversed. 881 
Finally, in cases taking identical views of the unconstitutionality of 
state intestacy laws concerning illegitimates, the court held that the 
proper remedy was for the court to grant the Social Security Administra-
tion benefits that would have been awarded but for the unconstitutional 
state laws. Those decisions dealt with the intestacy laws of Georgia81111 and 
Alabama. 888 • 
K. Standard of Review 
No administrativ.e law issue appears more frequently before a court 
than the standard of review the court should apply to the agency decision 
being challenged. The general categories of review under the AP A 884 were 
routinely invoked by the Eleventh Circuit, and applied with no startling 
or remarkable. developments. One leading administrative law text uses a 
recent Eleventh Circuit standard of review decision as an example of the 
typical judicial review of the reasonableness rather than the 'rightness' of 
agency determinations of fact. 8&& 
The essential question involved in standard of review issues is how 
much deference the reviewing courts will give to agency decisions. The 
answer depends, of course, on what the agency has decided. 888 The Elev-
enth Circuit decisions surveyed in this two year period illustrate the im-
portance of the deference issue. 
In a few Eleventh Circuit decisions, an agency's interpretation of statu-
tory terms was held to be subject to substantially independent review by 
331. /d. at 1049. 
332. Cox v. Schweiker, 684 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1982) (Former 5th). 
333. Handley v. Schweiker, 697 F.2d 999 (11th Cir. 1983). 
334. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982). A comprehensive analysis of standards of review can be 
found in Koch, Confining Judicial Authority Over Administrative Action, 49 Mo. L. REV. 
- (1984). 
335. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 9, § 10.8, at 601 & n.8 (citing Home Health Servs., Inc. v. 
Schweiker, 683 F.2d 353, 357 (11th Cir. 1982)). 
336. More fruitful exploration of the intricacies of standard of review decisions would 
probably proceed on an agency-by-agency basis. In part, I think this is true because writing 
at other than abstract levels about the law of standards of review is an attempt to hit a 
moving target. One of the practical factors that undoubtedly affects the degree of deference 
a court displays toward an agency is the trust the court bas in the agency's good faith com· 
mitment to carrying out both the letter and the spirit of the statutory program it adminis-
ters. When such trust is absent, as I believe it probably should be absent in the present 
administration's operation of the major entitlement programs, the standard of review could 
easily become more rigorous without any change in the general language courts use to define 
and describe the standard being employed. Empirical studies of the relationship between 
courts and the Social Security Administration under the present administration may bear 
out this hypothesis. 
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the court. 887 In some cases, however, when the agency's interpretation in-
volved a choice between competing policy concerns, and that interpreta-
tion was consistent with the statutory language and purpose, as indepen-
dently determined by the court, then deference was given to the 
agency.888 
A substantial evidence standard of review is essentially a reasonable-
.ness standard. In several Eleventh Circuit decisions, the reviewing court 
required the agency to explain 'how' it reached its decision, so that the 
court could determine whether the correct legal standard had been. ap-
plied. 888 In addition, the Eleventh Circuit held that decisions turning on 
the credibility of witnesses are proper for the agency to make without 
much interference by courts. As a corollary to the proposition that the 
agency be required to explain how it reached its decision, the agency may 
be required to report that the decision actually was based on a credibility 
determination. 840 During the survey period, the court generally gave 
closer scrutiny to agency decisions when they were contrarY' to the initial 
decision of the ALJ who pre~ided over the hearing. This scrutiny is em-
ployed by the court to determine whether the decision is supported by 
substantial evidence even though the ALJ ruled adversely.841 
The court also gave more deference to legislative rules adopted under 
procedures that assured some opportunity for public participation than 
they gave to rules adopted without such procedures. 842 The Eleventh Cir-
337. See, e.g., Hospital Auth. v. Heckler, 707 F.2d 456 (11th Cir. 1983); American Truck-
ing Aaa'n v. ICC, 672 F.2d 850 (11th Cir. 1982); Charter Limousine, Inc. v. Dade County Bd. 
of County Comm'rs, 678 F.2d 586, 588 (5th Cir. 1982) (Unit B). 
338. See, e.g., Marti-Xiques v. Immigration & Naturalization Servs., 713 F.2d 1511, 
1515-16 (11th Cir. 1983); Railroad Concrete Cr088tie Corp. v. Railroad Retirement Bd., 709 
F.2d 1404, 1407-09 (11th Cir. 1983); Powell v. Schweiker, 688 F.2d 1357 (11th Cir. 1982); 
Brown & Root Dev., Inc. v. TVA, 681 F.2d 1313, 1316-17 (11th Cir. 1982); Southern Motor 
Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 676 F.2d 1374, 1377 (11th Cir. 1982). 
339. See, e.g., Thornton v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 715 F.2d 1508, 1510 (lith 
Cir. 1983); Smith v. Heckler, 707 F.2d 1284 (11th Cir. 1983); Boyd v. Heckler, 704 F.2d 1207, 
1209 (11th Cir. 1983); Jones v. Heckler, 702 F.2d 950 (11th Cir. 1983); Home Health Servs., 
Inc. v. Schweiker, 683 F.2d 353 (11th Cir. 1982); Freeman v. Schweiker, 681 F.2d 727 (11th 
Cir. 1982); Wiggins v. Schweiker, 679 F.2d 1387 (11th Cir. 1982); Walden v. Schweiker, 672 
F.2d 835, 839-40 (11th Cir. 1982); Watkins v. Schweiker, 667 F.2d 954 (11th Cir. 1982). 
340. See, e.g., Bloodworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1242 (11th Cir. 1983); Walden v. 
Schweiker, 672 F.2d 835, 839-40 (11th Cir. 1982) .. 
341. See, e.g., Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm. v. United States, 704 F.2d 538, 542-43 (11th 
Cir. 1983); Cities of Lakeland & Tallahassee, & Gainesville Regional Util. v. Federal Energy 
Regulatory Comm'n, 702 F.2d 1302 (11th Cir. 1983); Georgia Kraft Co. v. NLRB, 696 F.2d 
931 (11th Cir. 1983); Equifax, Inc. v. FTC, 678 F.2d 1047 (11th Cir. 1982). 
342. See, e.g., Ryder Truck Lines v. United.States, 716 F.2d 1369, 1377-78 (11th Cir. 
1983); Memorial Hosp. v. Heckler, 706 F.2d 1130 (11th Cir. 1983); Frank Diehl Farms v. 
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cuit also treated with deference agency interpretations of authority that 
.were adopted contemporaneously with the enactment of the enabling leg-
islation or that have been consistently applied.848 In addition, agency in-
terpretations of their own regulations are entitled to greater deference 
than agency constructions of the statutes under which they operate. A 
reviewing court, however, may still determine whether the interpretation 
is plainly erroneous, or whether it is inconsistent with either the regula-
tion itself or the underlying statute."' 
343. "See, e.g., FidalgoNelez v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 697 F.2d 1026, 1029 
(11th Cir. 1983); Frank Diehl Farms v. Secretary of Labor, 696 F.2d 1325, 1330 (11th Cir. 
1983); Veterlllli Admin. Medical Center v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 675 F.2d 260, 262 
(11th Cir. 1982). 
344. South Georgia Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 699 F.2d 
1088, 1090 (11th Cir. 1983). 
